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Unofficial Development Assistance: 
A Dynamic Model of Charities’ Donation Income
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The empirical literature on the determinants of charities donation income, distinguishing the 
charitable cause, is small. We extend the literature in several ways. First, we focus on 
overseas development charities allowing us to give more consideration to the particular 
characteristics of this cause. Second, we look at the impact of macroeconomic change over a 
quarter century including changes in household income and in government spending on 
ODA, as well as ‘charity level’ variables that earlier authors have considered. Third, we use a 
general dynamic model and rigorous testing procedures to arrive at our specification. Using a 
newly assembled long panel of data, we find evidence of a strong, but diminishing fundraising 
effect. We find no evidence of crowding out by either grants made directly to charities or by 
changes in the public provision of development funding. 
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Rich countries are important donors of development ﬁnance to poorer countries. At-
tention often focuses on Ofﬁcial Development Assistance (ODA), given by governments
in the form of bilateral or multilateral aid. However, contributions from private individ-
uals are also prominent. These include remittances from migrants, which surpass ODA
in importance and that have been the subject of considerable study (e.g. see Solimano
2005). But they also include donations made to charities working abroad for overseas aid
and humanitarian assistance. These private charitable donations for overseas development
have received much less attention from researchers. The large theoretical and empirical
literatures on charitable giving tend not to distinguish giving by cause (e.g. see the survey
in Andreoni (2006)). In this paper, we model donations received by overseas development
charities in one rich country, the UK. In 2004–5, giving in this form was equal to about a
quarter of the ﬁgure for the UK’s ODA, a not inconsiderable amount.
We use a newly constructed panel on individual charity ﬁnances that spans over 25
years. Our focus on giving for overseas development rather than total giving allows us to
pay more attention to the particular characteristics of giving to this cause. Our empirical
modelling draws in part on the theoretical model proposed by Atkinson (2009), who ex-
plicitly considers the giving to overseas development charities by private individuals. Our
work extends the existing empirical literature that has focused on charity level factors,
such as fundraising and government grants received by charities. As well as these inﬂu-
ences we consider three important aspects of the changing external environment within
which overseas development charities have operated over the quarter century that is our
focus.
First, we analyse the impact of ODA on private giving for development. Such public
provision of a public good may crowd out private provision but it is a possibility that
has seen little or no attention. The crowding-out hypothesis has typically been studied
with respect to changes in the provision of public grants to individual charities. However,
as made clear by the models developed in Duncan (2004) and, for the speciﬁc case of
2overseasdevelopment, Atkinson(2009), anincreaseinpublicprovisionofthepublicgood
may have a similar crowding-out effect by increasing the welfare of the end-recipients of
the charity’s work. ODA represents public provision of this sort.
Second, we consider the impact of changes in the macroeconomic environment in
which donations are made. In particular, the substantial changes in household income
over the period that we consider allow us to estimate the income elasticity of giving
for overseas development. Although the existing empirical literature on charitable giv-
ing contains many estimates of income elasticities there are relatively few of giving by
cause.1 The 2008–9 recession has highlighted interest in the impact of the economic cy-
cle on private giving, including the speciﬁc giving for overseas development (House of
Commons 2009).
Third, we estimate the impact of major disasters on donations – a key feature in giving
to international charities – of which the Ethiopian famine of the early 1980s and the Asian
Tsunami 20 years later are the most prominent examples. In the case of the Ethiopian
famine we investigate a continuing impact on overseas giving in addition to the short-run
impact.
Section 2 outlines our framework for modelling giving for overseas development,
drawing on the existing literature. Section 3 describes our panel data on individual charity
ﬁnances, which are assembled from the annual publication Charity Trends of the Charities
Aid Foundation (CAF). The same source was drawn on by Khanna, Posnett and Sandler
(1995) and Khanna and Sandler (2000). However, these authors did not consider the im-
pact of changes in the external environment on charitable donations as their data covered
only eight years, in contrast to the 27 years included in our panel. The impact of ODA,
household incomes, and disasters do not feature in their analysis. Nor did their work have
any particular focus on the determinants of overseas giving, much of which focuses on
giving to all causes taken together (although ‘overseas’ is one of four sub-sectors that they
use in some of their modelling).
1 These use survey microdata on households (e.g. Micklewright and Schnepf 2009) rather than
data on the total donations received by individual charities, as we use in this paper.
3Section 4 explains our econometric speciﬁcation. We introduce GMM estimation to
the literature on modelling charities’ incomes. This allows us to address adequately the
issues of endogeneity that pervade empirical modelling of charities’ donations, as noted
by earlier authors. It also permits our model to have a dynamic speciﬁcation, which we
argue to be appropriate, in contrast to the static speciﬁcations used by earlier authors.
Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes.
2. Modelling charitable giving for development
Charities receive income from a number of sources such as the sale of goods and ser-
vices, grants and voluntary contributions in the form of money donations. Much of the
literature on giving has focused on modelling donations as a function of donor charac-
teristics such as income using household or individual level data (see Peloza and Steel
(2005) for a survey). Other studies (e.g. Khanna and Sandler (2000) and Tinkleman
(2004)) have sought to model donation receipts as a function of charity characteristics
such as fundraising expenditure. Donation expenditure of households and the donation
receipts of charities are simply two sides of the same coin and are a function of both
donor and charity characteristics. Andreoni (2006) in his survey of the literature empha-
sises that ‘the interaction between supply and demand for philanthropy has been largely
neglected in both theoretical and empirical analysis’. Our empirical model contains ele-
ments suggested from work on both sides of the market, integrating both aggregate donor
and individual charity characteristics into a single framework.
On the supply side, there is a rich body of theory based on public goods and ‘warm-
glow’ motives. Models have not usually focused on any particular charitable cause. In this
sense, giving has tended to be treated as a homogeneous good; however people are often
not indifferent as to where their donation ends up – they deliberately give to a speciﬁc
cause. Atkinson(2009)arguesthatthepublicgoodsandwarm-glowmodelsfailtocapture
key aspects of giving to international development charities, including donor motivation
and the ways that charities set about fundraising. He proposes a new ‘identiﬁcation’
4model that incorporates elements of both the existing approaches.
In Atkinson’s model, individuals giving money to a development charity ‘identify’
with the ultimate recipients on a one-to-m basis, where m is a small number, e.g. the
marginal poor family or village to which the charity can extend help with the individual’s
donation – reﬂected in how charities often promote their work when seeking funds. The
m recipients’ wellbeing enters the donor’s utility function – giving for development is
not merely motivated by warm glow. In contrast to the public goods model, however,
donor utility is not affected by the well-being of all recipients. This is similar to the
‘impact giving’ model of Duncan (2004), although Duncan had no speciﬁc charitable
cause in mind. So the standard problem of the public goods model – free riding on others’
donations – does not arise. The ‘identiﬁcation’ model can therefore explain why people
do contribute to large development charities.
Government ODA, our ﬁrst focus, features prominently in the model: unlike other
people’s donations, ODA is assumed to inﬂuence the living standards of the recipients
with whom the donor identiﬁes. This provides a possible source of crowding-out. The
same effect would occur within Duncan’s impact giving model – public provision of the
public good reduces need and hence donor motivation. In this case, increases in ODA lead
to lower donations.2 In view of the scale of ODA in relation to private donations, under-
lined in the Introduction, it seems essential to take this possibility into account when mod-
elling empirically development charities’ donation income. On the other hand, ‘crowding
in’ of private donations can be expected if increases in ODA raise donors’ or potential
donors’ perceptions of need by drawing attention to problems of developing countries.
An increase in ODA may act as a signal. For example, the UK government’s prominent
commitment in the late 1990s to increase ODA and its recent pledge to sustain ODA lev-
els might be seen in this light. Finally, some donors may of course be unaware of ODA
levels or changes.
2 However, Atkinson (2009) notes that in practice ODA and private donations may not be perfect
substitutes. They may fund different activities. Were these to be complementary, ODA would
crowd in private donations. He offers the example of ODA funding school construction while
private donations fund the textbooks.
5Household income, our second focus, is emphasised in the warm glow approach and
again features in the identiﬁcation model. The quarter-century covered by our panel of
charities saw a 2.5 fold increase in real after-tax household incomes in the UK. In other
work with UK survey data on individuals, the authors ﬁnd little evidence that the income
elasticity of donations to international development differs much from that for ‘domestic’
causes, taken together (Micklewright and Schnepf 2009). In the present paper we exploit
variation in incomes over time rather than across individuals to add to what is only a
small existing pool of evidence on how the impact of income on charitable giving varies
by cause. Income growth was far from steady across the period we consider and our panel
covers the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s. We also allow for changes in
the distribution of income. The rise in income in the UK was accompanied by a change
in its distribution. Over the period as a whole, inequality of incomes rose substantially. If
those on higher incomes have a higher marginal propensity to give we would expect this
to have led to an increase in donations. Glazer and Konrad (1996) present a signalling
model of charitable giving that predicts an increase in giving arising from an increase in
inequality.
An empirical model of charitable donations that focuses on international development
charities needs to recognise emergency relief as an important inﬂuence on giving, a third
novel feature of our analysis. A major humanitarian crisis can have an immediate and
large impact on the donors’ perceptions of need that are at the heart of the identiﬁcation
model. The period which we consider includes the Ethiopian famine in 1984-85 and
the Asian Tsunami of Christmas 2004. Both of these disasters saw huge responses from
private donors. In the case of the Ethiopian famine, we explore the possibility of persistent
long-term effects on giving which have not been considered in the literature to date.
Besides allowing for these three inﬂuences on donations, we follow existing practise
by considering the impact of fundraising, government grants, and other autonomous in-
comes (e.g. bequests), drawing on the (smaller) literature that focuses on the demand side.
The importance of fundraising is underlined by Andreoni (2006): ‘fund-raisers know that
to get money donated, you have to ask for it’, and asking for money, including promotion
6of a charity’s work in the eyes of potential donors, costs money. Within Atkinson’s iden-
tiﬁcation model, fundraising campaigns help increase the awareness of recipients’ need.
Fundraising therefore has a direct positive impact on donations. But, following Rose-
Ackerman (1982) and Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986), fundraising is assumed also to
affect the ‘price’ of donations, which is a measure of the cost to a donor of increasing the
charitable output of a charity by £1. This is generally speciﬁed as (1−t)/(1−f−a) where t
is marginal rate of tax faced by the individual and f and a are the proportions of total ex-
penditure spent by the charity on fundraising and administration respectively. Fundraising
and administration are seen in the literature in this context of price as leakages, increasing
the price of giving and hence hypothesised to reduce giving. As Atkinson points out, the
threat of leakage features prominently in debate about overseas aid. It is, however, typi-
cally the leakage that is perceived to takes place through corruption and misgovernment
in the recipient country.3 The price variable captures none of this loss of funds (unless one
can argue that the loss is reﬂected in higher administration costs resulting from charities’
attempts to deal with the problem). However, we include the price variable so as to aid
comparability with the earlier literature.
Fundraising and administrative expenditure may also have a second negative effect on
donations if a charity’s reputation is affected by what donors perceive to be an excessive
level of fundraising, as opposed to a share in total expenditure. A large fundraising drive
increases the price faced by donors in the sense just deﬁned but may have a secondary
negative impact on donors’ desire to contribute to that particular charity if the observed
level of advertising, e.g. direct mailings, is perceived as excessive. This effect may be
different from donor response to leakage, as captured by the price. The price captures the
changes in the size of the donation required to increase the welfare of the end-beneﬁciary
by some desired amount. Such a price will be greater than one for any positive level of
fundraising or administrative expenditure and captures the relative level of non-charitable
expenditures, whereas the excessive fundraising effect is caused by absolute excess non-
3 For example, see the qualitative research reported in Atkinson and Eastwood (2007), carried out
as part of our ESRC-funded project.
7charitable expenditures. We therefore allow donations to be non-linear in non-charitable
expenditures such as fundraising, as well as including the price of giving as in the earlier
literature.
Government grants to charities may crowd out their donation income – donors seeing
the charity as less needy. Or they may ‘crowd in’ more giving, being viewed by donors
as a signal that a charity is worth supporting. There are also arguments for no impact:
Horne et al (2005) ﬁnd that donors, responding to a US survey, have little knowledge of
the government grants received by the charities to which they give.4 In the case of the
UK overseas development charities, these grants represented a total of about £250m in
2004–5, compared to donations of about £1bn (Atkinson et al. 2008). Over the period we
consider, they grew enormously, by a factor of 10 between the late 1970s and the mid-
1990s when there was a levelling off. In general, these grants are to fund programme work
in developing countries, and therefore they are included in ﬁgures for ODA, although they
constitute only a small part of the total (about 5 per cent in 2004). We do not hypothesise
the sign of any impact, since as noted earlier there are arguments for both crowding out
and for crowding in.
We therefore specify our model for the donations received by a development charity
as a dynamic model using the following general form:
Donations = f

    

















unobserved charity ﬁxed effects

     
       

(1)
Prior empirical studies using charity level data have been restricted to the Group B
variables. Group A are variables that our long panel allow us to consider in addition.
We also allow for unobserved charity level effects (sometimes allowed for in the existing
4 Andreoni and Payne (2003) argue that crowding out by grants may occur on the demand side, by
reducing fundraising, as well as on the supply side.
8literature, depending on whether panel data were used), which may be correlated with
observed variables. This could include a charity’s long-term reputation, for example. Fi-
nally, in another major departure from previous practice, we allow for a general dynamic
model and use rigorous testing procedures to arrive at a parsimonious speciﬁcation al-
though only the lagged value of donations is signiﬁcant among the lagged variables in
the chosen speciﬁcation. There are good institutional reasons for such a dynamic spec-
iﬁcation. For example, many individuals make donations through bank standing orders,
which they fail to adjust each year as their circumstances change. Consider the exam-
ple of a charity that hires fundraisers to sign up new donors among high street shoppers
(charity ‘chuggers’ as they have become known in the UK). New donors sign up to give
indeﬁnitely and the charity’s fundraising expenditure in that year produces a continued
stream of income. The dynamic model we use allows us to separate out the persistence
found in the donations data that is due to an unobserved charity-speciﬁc effect from that
due to the effect coming via lagged donations. The model also allows us to separate the
long-run effects from the short-run ones.
The existing literature has led to varied conclusions about the impact of the Group B
variables. The two UK papers that have used much shorter panels constructed from the
CAF data to estimate static models, Khanna et al. (1995) and Khanna and Sandler (2000)
both found no impact of government grants on giving to overseas charities and a positive
impact of fundraising, but sharply differing impacts of the price variable. Khanna et al.
(1995) addressed the potential endogeneity of the Group B variables with what they admit
is the ‘quick ﬁx’ (p.1547) of replacing current values with the one period lags, a practice
also adopted by Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and Okten and Weisbrod (2000) in
models for the US. Khanna and Sandler instrumented government grants but treated other
variables as exogenous. In what follows we instrument all potentially endogenous vari-
ables within a dynamic model, the dynamic speciﬁcation allowing for the identiﬁcation
of both long-run and short-run impacts unlike in the earlier literature.
93. Data and variable deﬁnitions
Our data come from the Charity Trends reports published by the Charities Aid Foun-
dation (CAF) from 1978 to 2006, covering donations to 2004.5 The reports document
the donations, bequests, other incomes, e.g. government grants and selected expenditures
of the leading fundraising charities in the UK. The ﬁgures for donations for each char-
ity are obtained by subtracting the ﬁgure for legacies from the total given for ‘voluntary
income’, the variable on which the CAF rankings are based. CAF ﬁrst included the top
200 fundraising charities. Coverage increased to the top 300 in 1985 and top 400 in 1986,
and ﬁnally the top 500 from 1991. The great bulk of donations come from individuals; a
small part comes from the corporate sector and grant-making charitable trusts but these
donations cannot be separated in the data. Full details of the data and how we cleaned and
then assembled them into a panel are given in Atkinson et al. (2008).
We deﬁne as ‘development’ charities both the charities grouped under this heading
in the CAF reports and the ‘religious international’ charities that are separately identiﬁed
by CAF.6 The dataset contains a total of 70 overseas development charities that appear
in Charity Trends at least once during the period we analyse, of which we drop two, for
reasons explained below, leaving us with 68. We lose a further 10 charities (21 observa-
tions in total) as there must be at least three observations for the estimation method we
use (discussed in detail below). The names of the remaining 58 charities are listed in
Appendix A, together with, in each case, the year of entry to the dataset and the number
of annual observations for the charity. The panel has gaps meaning the number of obser-
vations is not always the same as the exit year minus the entry year plus 1. These gaps
appear for a number of reasons including changing accounting years, duplicate data used
by CAF from one year to the next and unavailable CAF reports (see Atkinson et al. 2008).
The charities all have a principal focus on overseas development and relief, but include a
5 The last CAF report in this series was published in 2007, but a change in deﬁnition means that
the information for donations in that year is not consistent with that in earlier years. There was
no report in 1995, and we did not have access to the report for 1981.
6 We exclude the Priory of St John, commonly known as St John Ambulance, which is included
by CAF in the ﬁrst group. We do not include missionary charities.
10number that serve domestic as well as overseas causes e.g. the Red Cross and Save the
Children. The median year of entry is 1989 and the median number of observations is 12
years.
There was a striking rise in the real value of donations across the quarter-century
that we consider, with an average annual growth rate for overseas charities among the
top 200 fundraisers of nearly 7.5 per cent, a little above that for charities as a whole (see
Atkinson et al. 2008 for details). This growth far outstripped the 2 per cent average annual
growth in real after-tax household income. It was also far larger than the rise in the UK
government’s ODA, which grew in real terms by a factor of just 1.5 over the period, with
a decline in the early 1980s and stagnation until the late 1990s when renewed growth
followed a commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP.
The years 1984-85 saw a spike in overseas donations on account of the response to the
Ethiopian famine. This was in part stimulated by Bob Geldof, who organised the Band
Aid Christmas single in 1984 and the Live Aid concerts in 1985. Geldof’s Band Aid Trust
was the charity with the most donations in the UK in 1985 – among all causes and not just
overseas development – with £122m (in 2007 prices). We exclude this charity from our
analysis since it was not founded to engage in annual fundraising. Its removal still leaves
a spike in the two years. For example, Oxfam had a record year in 1984, with its £109m
of donations (in 2007 prices) nearly double the level of the year before. We also exclude
Comic Relief which raises funds with a telethon and associated events every two years,
so it does not raise funds each year like other charities.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the variables entered in our model. Besides total
after-tax income, we include a measure of income inequality that focuses on the top half
of the distribution, the ratio of the 90th to the 50th percentile of equivalised household
net income.7 We experiment with two measures of ODA. The ﬁrst is in levels and is net
of government grants to overseas development charities, which are included in ODA, as
explained earlier. The second measure is total ODA. We experiment with this alternative
7 The variable is taken from http://www.ifs.org.uk/ﬁscalFacts and refers to equivalised after-tax
(before housing costs) household income.
11measure on the grounds that donors or potential donors may be more aware of this way
of describing the extent of the UK government’s provision since it is the way that ODA is
often presented in the mass media.
[Table 1 about here]
The main body of Table 1 reports on the charity level variables. The unit of analysis
is the charity-year. Mean annual donations received by development charities is £11.5m
(2007 prices). Information on fundraising is missing or is recorded as zero in 10 percent
of cases. The percentages of zeros or missing data are substantially higher for government
grants – 39 percent and 60 percent respectively. In the case of fundraising, the absence
of positive values is not easy to understand – these are all charities that are among the
top 500 in terms of donated income and it does not seem likely that this status can be
attained without spending money on raising funds. It seems more likely that fundraising
expenditure has been absorbed into administration costs, which we identify separately in
the table. Average fundraising costs are about 20 percent of donations. Note that charities
have other forms of income, legacies and investment income – their sum is entered in
the table as ‘autonomous’ income. So the message is not that charities are spending on
average a ﬁfth to a quarter of their total income on fundraising. In the case of government
grants, zeros or missing values are easy to understand – many charities do not get gov-
ernment grants. Note that the mean value of the grants, conditional on being positive, is
large relative to donations.
As noted in Section 2, the ‘price’ variable is designed to capture the cost to the donor
of increasing a charity’s charitable output by £1. Following Okten and Weisbrod (2000),
and Tinkelman (2004) we assume donors calculate the price of giving using the previous
period’s expenditure ﬁgures due to information lags that are inherent in the distribution





12where fit−1 and ait−1 are the proportion of total expenditure spent on fundraising
and administration, respectively, in the previous year. Following the earlier papers using
UK data by Posnet and Sandler (1989), Khanna et al (1995) and Khanna and Sandler
(2000), we do not include a tax rate when calculating the price variable. Prior to 2000,
tax deductions for charitable donations in the UK required giving through one’s employer
via a payroll deduction or agreeing to covenant income to a charity for several years.8
The price variable is calculated only for those observations with positive fundraising and
administrative expenditure and represents the average rather than marginal price of in-
creasing the charities output by £1. Administrative expenditure is sometimes excluded in
the calculation of the price variable (Tinkelman 2004) as the purpose of such expenditure
is not immediately clear (e.g. managing the charitable output of the charity or managing
fundraising staff). The utility of donors can be modelled as a function of the welfare of the
ﬁnal recipients of the charities ‘output’ or charitable expenditure. The price of increasing
this ‘output’ by one unit therefore accounts for the proportion of the donation that goes to
any expense other than the end-recipient, including administrative expenditure, although
this may in part be beneﬁting the end-recipient indirectly.
4. Model speciﬁcation and estimation
After applying rigorous testing procedure to arrive at a parsimonious representation of
the data generation process for log donations y, we have the following dynamic model9:
yit = γyit−1+x´tβ+z´itθ+αi+εit (3)
where i and t index charities and years respectively, yit−1 is the one-period lag of
8 Following the same authors, we use the share of total expenditure going to non-charitable expen-
ditures in the construction of the price variable. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and Okten and
Weisbrod (2000) use the share of donations going to non-charitable expenditure. Results are not
sensitive to the choice of the denominator in equation (2).
9 We ﬁnd the log of donations to be more appropriate given the highly skewed distribution of the
donations data.
13the charity’s (log) donations, and αi is included to capture charity-speciﬁc unobservables
(possibly correlated with the included regressors). The vector zit contains the Group B
charity-speciﬁc variables: fundraising expenditure, administrative expenditure, govern-
ment grants, ‘autonomous’ income, and the ‘price’ variable.10 In section 2 we argue for a
non-linear impact of fundraising and the other variables so we enter them in the model in
quadratic form (a log form was tested and rejected by the data). We also include a series
of dummy variables to pick up observations with non-positive values for these variables
to avoid omitting a signiﬁcant proportion of observations (we have noted the prevalence
of zeroes above.) The effect of these variables on donations is estimated therefore from
the positive values only.
The vector xt includes the Group A macroeconomic variables affecting the environ-
ment in which donations to overseas development are made: ODA net of government
grants, total household income, the 90-50 ratio of household income, and dummy vari-
ables to capture the very large disasters that occurred during the observation period, the
Ethiopian famine in 1984–85 and the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. Since the tsunami dis-
aster took place at the very end of 2004, we deﬁne the dummy equal to one for those
charities with their ﬁnancial year ending in the ﬁrst six months of 2005. All these macro
variables are treated as strictly exogenous in all speciﬁcations.
There are several econometric issues that need to be addressed in the estimation of
equation (3). The ﬁrst concerns the treatment of the charity speciﬁc variables. The con-
temporaneous values of fundraising, administration and grants may be correlated with the
contemporaneous error term εit. A positive shock to donations means that a charity can
afford to spend more on fundraising. Such a shock could have positive or negative effects
on the government grants it receives, depending on how these grants are allocated.11 If
all such correlations can be captured by the unobserved heterogeneity αi, and no lags of
donations enter among an explanatory variables, the within-group (WG) estimator would
10 Note that we exclude the age of the organisation, used in some earlier papers, since in the ﬁxed-
effects framework we employ the age would simply reduce to an individual time trend.
11 Note the price variable calculated, as we have argued, using the previous period’s expenditure
ﬁgures may be treated as pre-determined, i.e. correlated with past and not current values of the
error term εit if εit is not serially correlated.
14be consistent. However, in a dynamic model containing a lag of the dependent variable,
such as ours, the WG estimator is biased in small samples although the bias goes to zero
as T increases (Nickell 1981) as is the case with some charities in our sample.
Weexperimentwithestimationofequation(1)usingtheWGestimator. Thisestimator
will be inconsistent if there is correlation between the regressors and εit, when allowing
for the αi, as suggested by our discussion of the effects of shocks. A standard approach
to the estimation of dynamic panel data models with endogenous regressors is the Gener-
alised Method of Moments (GMM) applied to the ﬁrst differenced equation (GMM-diff)
in order to eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity αi that might be correlated with the re-
gressors. However, as our panel has gaps we use the forward orthogonal deviation (FOD)
transformation (Bover and Arellano 1995) to eliminate αi rather than ﬁrst differencing the
data. Instead of subtracting the previous observation from the current, the FOD trans-
formation subtracts the average of all future available observations.12 No matter how
many gaps, this is computable for all observations except the last in the sample and hence
preserves sample sizes in panel data with gaps.13 In addition, the transformed error will
still be serially uncorrelated if the original equation error term is serially uncorrelated,
provided there is no heteroscedasticity in the time dimension (Bover and Arellano 1995).
Estimates are obtained using xtabond2 in Stata (Roodman 2009a).
A practical problem with the GMM approach is that the number of instruments, which
increases quadratically in T, can be numerous. Unlike in two-stage-least-squares (2SLS),
where the estimation sample is restricted according to the choice of lags for the instru-
ment, in standard applications of GMM a separate instrument is included for each time
period. This approach can produce a large number of instruments which can lead to a
ﬁnite-sample bias of the GMM estimator.
Roodman (2009b) notes that ‘simply by being numerous, instruments can over-ﬁt











mation subtracts the average of the future values from the current value. The weighting equalises
the variances in the above transformation.
13 For example, if a particular yit is missing, then both ∆yit = yit −yit−1 and ∆yit+1 will be missing.
15instrumented variables, failing to expunge their endogenous components and biasing co-
efﬁcient estimates toward those from non-instrumenting estimators.’ (p. 139) Roodman
proposes two methods to deal with the problem of instrument proliferation: (i) collapse
the instrument set, and (ii) truncate the instrument set.
Roodman (2009a) suggests collapsing the instrument set to reduce the number of in-
struments used in GMM (see Appendix B for details). The number of instruments in the
collapsed instrument matrix, Zi, increases linearly in T, rather than quadratically as in the
uncollapsed set. However, the number of instruments can still be large and thus collaps-
ing the instrument set may not sufﬁciently eliminate the ﬁnite-sample bias in of the GMM
estimator.
We therefore test the sensitivity of our results to truncations of the instrument set, a
second method recommended by Roodman (2009b) for limiting instrument proliferation.
In practice this means limiting the number of lags of the endogenous regressors used in
the instrument set. Alvarez and Arellano (2003) show that the Arellano–Bond estimator
is consistent when the lag length of the instrument set is arbitrarily truncated. Alfaro
(2008) undertakes a Monte Carlo study of GMM with large T and ﬁnds that truncating
the instrument set reduces efﬁciency, creating a trade-off between ﬁnite-sample bias and
efﬁciency. Roodman (2009b) notes that the problems arising from instrument prolifera-
tion are most severe in the case of system GMM. Judson and Owen (1999) show in Monte
Carlo simulations that when T becomes large the one-step GMM estimator outperforms
the two-step. We therefore use the one-step variant of difference GMM in our estimations.
We use tests for over-identiﬁcation and the tests for ﬁrst and second order serial cor-
relations to choose our preferred speciﬁcation and the set of instruments. The ﬁrst is the
Sargan test for over-identiﬁcation (Sargan 1958), which requires non-rejection of the null
hypothesis that the instruments are valid. The Sargan test is robust to instrument prolif-
eration but not to heteroscedasticity. We also use the Hansen test (Hansen 1982) that,
like the Sargan test, requires non-rejection of the null hypothesis that the instruments are
valid. The Hansen test, however, is robust to heteroscedasticity, but not to instrument
proliferation. A large number of instruments can severely weaken the Hansen test pro-
16ducing questionably high p-values. We also use serial correlation tests (Arellano and
Bond 1991). White noise errors εit would imply a MA(1) process for the ￿εit, thus the
speciﬁcation test is passed by rejecting the null of no ﬁrst order serial correlation but not
rejecting the null of no second order serial correlation. We also check the robustness of
our results to reductions of the lags used in the instrument set and, as discussed below, to
sample selection.
Weestimateequation(3)viaPooledOLS,WithinGroup(WG),andGMMandpresent
the results in Table 2. (We do not report estimated coefﬁcients of dummy variables for
missing or zero fundraising, administrative expenditure, government grant, autonomous
income or price variables). Cluster robust standard errors are reported in parentheses (the
charities are the clusters). We ﬁrst estimate a fully dynamic model including lags on all
regressors using GMM (results not reported). None of the lagged regressors, with the
exception of lagged donations, are signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level and they are jointly
insigniﬁcant (p-value=0.862). We therefore take as our starting point a partial adjustment
speciﬁcation. We also estimate the model (not reported) with two lags and the results are
qualitatively the same with the two-period lags insigniﬁcant for all regressors.
[Table 2 about here]
Columns (1) to (5) report results from the partial adjustment models. Column (1)
presents the results from a pooled OLS estimation of equation (1). There is no allowance
made for unobserved charity-speciﬁc effects or for the endogeneity of the charity-speciﬁc
regressors. We test for the presence of ﬁxed individual effects and, using an F-test, re-
ject the null of no individual effects (p-value=0.000) indicating the pooled OLS estimator
is inconsistent.14 Column (2) presents results from the WG estimation (i.e. OLS on
variables entered in deviations from time-means) which allows for unobserved charity-
speciﬁc effects but not for the endogeneity of the charity-speciﬁc regressors. Column (3)
presents results from GMM, allowing for fundraising, administrative expenditure, gov-
14 Orme and Yamagata (2006) show that inferences from the standard F-test procedure are still
asymptotically valid when N → ∞ and T is ﬁxed.
17ernment grants and autonomous income to be correlated with both the idiosyncratic error
εit as well as the charity speciﬁc unobservable αi and treating price as predetermined (un-
correlated with contemporaneous errors but correlated with past errors). The model in
column (3) is estimated with all the lags (two lags and deeper) of the administrative ex-
penditure, fundraising, grants and autonomous income (quadratically) as instruments. As
price is pre-determined, its one period lag is also included as a valid instrument.
While the results of AR(1) and AR(2) tests are acceptable for all the GMM models,
those from the Sargan and Hansen tests are not. In column (3) both tests have p-values
close to 1, which, in the case of the Hansen test, is the result of the large instrument
set.15 To reduce the number of instruments used in estimation, we truncate the lags to
be included in the construction of the instrument set. The estimated coefﬁcients display
substantial robustness to the choice of instrument set (see Table C.1 in Appendix C) al-
though the model performs the best with respect to the speciﬁcation tests discussed when
the lag length of the instrument set is truncated at 5 (column (4) of Table 2). Alternative
speciﬁcations (fully logarithmic and log-linear) of equation (3) were also estimated but
were rejected by the data, failing the Sargan and/or Hansen tests for all lag depths.
The quadratic terms for the charity speciﬁc variable other than fundraising in column
(4) are jointly insigniﬁcant (p-value=0.530). We therefore also report results from a more
parsimonious speciﬁcation where only fundraising enters quadratically to verify that the
model is not over-parametrised thus masking the effects of the charity speciﬁc regressors.
These effects remain insigniﬁcant though the partially quadratic speciﬁcation model in
column (5) performs better on the speciﬁcation tests. Here the model performs best with
the lag depth truncated at seven.
The signiﬁcance of lagged donations in the model indicates that a static speciﬁcation
is mis-speciﬁed and may be subject to omitted variable bias. We estimate a static version
of equation (3) via GMM and ﬁnd that the Sargan test is not passed, for any lag depth
of the instrument set, which can indicate model mis-speciﬁcation (Cameron and Trivedi
15 In general, a p-value close to 1 signiﬁes a problem with the test-statistic’s distribution under the
null.
182005). This is further evidence in favour of our dynamic speciﬁcation. The size of the
coefﬁcient on the lagged dependent variable falls by about a third between the OLS and
GMM estimations in columns (1) and (3). The estimated coefﬁcients in columns (2) and
(3) are generally very similar in size and signiﬁcance though the similarities between the
WG and GMM estimates are reduced when the instrument set is truncated and speciﬁca-
tion tests passed, suggesting that failure to reduce the number of instruments may indeed
result in the GMM estimator failing to ‘expunge the endogenous components’. The price
of donating is not signiﬁcant in any of the models that pass the required speciﬁcation tests.
As the GMM estimator used in column (5) passes the four speciﬁcation tests of in-
terest, we take this to be our base model. The results from this partially quadratic spec-
iﬁcation are also very robust to the choice of instrument set lag depth (see Table C.2 in
Appendix C). We also check the results for robustness to sample selection in Table 3
as there is the possibility that the construction of our dataset leads to an endogenously
generated sample. As discussed in Section 3, whether a particular charity appears in the
dataset for a particular year depends on whether the charity was ranked among the top R in
terms of the amount of donations received by this charity in that year. The data collection
procedure saw the value of R increase from 200 in 1978 to 500 in 1991. In the absence
of suitable instruments to deal with endogenous selection that might not be adequately
captured by the lags of the regressors, we check for sensitivity of the results to different
choices made with regard to the sample selected for the estimation.
[Table 3 about here]
We re-estimate equation (3) via GMM using only the single longest run of data (me-
dian of six years) for each charity (column (1)), only those charities with at least 6 ob-
servations, only those charities which appear in the data prior to 1985 (column (3)), only
those charities which appear in the data prior to 1991 (column (4)) and replacing the
macroeconomic variables with a time trend (column (5)). We ﬁnd general stability in the
size and signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcients in columns (1) to (5) are very
19similar to those in column (5) of Table 2, our base model. The estimated coefﬁcient on the
lagged dependent variable is smallest when using only the single longest spell for each
charity, which given the prevalence of gaps in our panel, excludes about a third of our
observations. Note that the price remains insigniﬁcant at conventional levels regardless
of the sample used.
5. Discussion
Our discussion focuses on the results from our base model of giving for development,
column (5) in Table 2. Our dynamic speciﬁcation means that both short- and long-run
effects can be identiﬁed. The estimated coefﬁcients on the Group A and B regressors can
be interpreted as the short-run effects. The long-run effects are obtained by dividing these
coefﬁcients by one minus the estimated coefﬁcient on lagged donations (We have noted
that the data reject the conventionally used static speciﬁcation where the short and long
run effects are assumed to be the same.) The size and signiﬁcance of lagged donations
is robust to both sample selection (see Table 3) and the choice of instrument set (see
Appendix C). We discus the short- and long-run effects of each variable in detail below.
Macroeconomic variables (Group A)
We do not ﬁnd evidence that ODA crowds out private donations – the coefﬁcient on
the log (net) ODA is statistically insigniﬁcant. This result is robust to the sample used
in the estimation. We also estimated the model using alternative speciﬁcations of ODA
(levels, share of GDP) but results were consistently insigniﬁcant. We cannot reject the
hypothesis that changes in the public provision of the public good, ODA, have no effect
on private giving, ceteris paribus.
Household income has a reasonably well-deﬁned short-run impact, statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 2 per cent level. The estimated elasticity of 0.63 indicates giving to be a
necessity in the short run but we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity (p-
value=0.341). This suggests that overseas donations are not very sensitive to changes in
20income in the short run, contrary to the worst fears of how donations respond in reces-
sionary periods. The estimate is generally robust to the selected sample, differing only for
the pre-1985 sample (see Table 3, Column 3). The point estimate of the long-run income
elasticityofdevelopmentdonationsissubstantiallyhigherthanthatoftheshort-runeffect,
1.81 (se=0.59), but again a null hypothesis of a unitary elasticity cannot be rejected.16
The impact of changes in the distribution of income, measured by the ninety-ﬁfty
ratio, is not statistically signiﬁcant although it is somewhat sensitive to sample selection
(see Table 3). We test the sensitivity of this result to the choice of distributional metric by
re-estimating the model using a Gini coefﬁcient. Results are not qualitatively affected as
the sign and signiﬁcance of changes in the distribution of income is the same regardless
of the choice of distributional metric.
We ﬁnd some evidence of a signiﬁcant negative effect as the signiﬁcance of the co-
efﬁcient on the ninety-ﬁfty ratio displays some sensitivity to sample selection. This re-
sult conﬂicts with the prediction of Glazer and Konrad (1996), though their model has no
development-speciﬁc component. The result suggests that greater inequality will decrease
giving for international development. This may be due to donors, observing increasing
inequality and, thus, increasing relative need domestically, substituting towards domestic
charities. Alternatively, it may be the case that wealthier are less generous though more
work is needed in this area.
Both the Ethiopian famine and the Boxing Day Tsunami had a powerful, positive im-
pact on giving for development. The Ethiopian famine saw donations to the development
charities included in our panel increase on average by around a third in 1984. The in-
signiﬁcance of the 1985 dummy suggests that the continuation of the famine did not have
an analogous impact in 1985. In fact, several large overseas charities, e.g. Oxfam, saw
donations fall from 1984 to 1985, presumably as donations were diverted to the Band Aid
Trust, which we exclude from our panel for a reason given earlier. Total giving for devel-
opment, including to Band Aid, actually increased by around a ﬁfth from 1984 to 1985.
16 Standard errors for the long-run elasticities are obtained using the delta method (see Wooldridge
2002, p.44).
21The estimated impact of the 2004 tsunami is slightly smaller than that for the Ethiopian
famine, donations rising on average by about 20 per cent.
We explore the possibility that the impact of the Ethiopian famine persisted by adding
a time trend starting in 1986. (We cannot do this for Boxing Day Tsunami since it oc-
curred at the end of the panel.) However, as not all development charities would have been
affected by the famine (some played no part in the relief effort) we deﬁne the trend only
for those charities that saw a large increase in donations. We deﬁne ‘large’ as an increase
in donations of at least 20 per cent in 1984 and/or 1985, although we test the sensitivity
of results to other deﬁnitions (deﬁning ‘large’ as an increase of 10 per cent or 30 per cent
makes little difference). We ﬁrst estimated the model with a standard time trend taking a
value of one in 1986 and increasing linearly. This is found to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
We therefore introduce the possibility of a decaying long-run impact by replacing the time
trend with its inverse (so the inverse trend is equal to one in 1986, 0.5 in 1987, 0.33 in
1988 and so on) and re-estimating the models in Table 2. Results for the impact of the
famine are reported in Table 4. Coefﬁcients on the other covariates were not materially
affected.
[Table 4 about here]
The famine appears to have had a persistent effect on giving to those development
charities that saw large increases in donations in 1984–85. Focusing on the results in
column (5) of Table 4, we see that in 1986, donations to those charities were on average 21
per cent higher, ceteris paribus. The decaying effect, as we have modeled it, suggests that
the persistent effect of the famine fell quickly, being inside a standard error by 1988–89.
Charity level variables (Group B)
The following discussion continues to focus on the results in column (5) of Table 2.
The impact of price, found to be large in absolute value and signiﬁcant for UK devel-
opment charities by Khanna and Sandler (2000), is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of
the models that pass the speciﬁcation tests. To check the robustness of this result, various
22speciﬁcations of the model were estimated: for example, price is insigniﬁcant at the 10
per cent level when entered in logs.
The signiﬁcance of price in previous studies may be due to using a variable based on
current year values for its components, or a failure to properly account for endogeneity of
donations and fundraising. The construction of the price variable using contemporaneous
fundraising and administrative expenditure may result in it measuring some otherwise un-
modelled non-linearity in fundraising. To test this, we estimated a model using a price
variable constructed from contemporaneous fundraising and administrative expenditures.
Treating price as endogenous now, we ﬁnd that the impact of price becomes larger (-5.29)
and signiﬁcant, although only at the 10 per cent level (p=0.067). However, inclusion of
price in this way violates the observation rule used in the literature (Tinkelman 2004).
The direct short-run impact of fundraising is well determined with a strong positive
effect across almost all the observed range of expenditures. The turning point is near the
very top of the distribution.17 The ﬁrst negative impact of additional fundraising, captured
by the price variable, is found to be insigniﬁcant. The second, a ‘reputation’ effect, is
described in the concavity of donations in fundraising with the very highest levels of
expenditure reducing donations, consistent with donors perceiving such expenditure as
proﬂigate.
Estimates of fundraising effectiveness have been used in the past to identify the strat-
egy of charitable fundraisers. A marginal effect not different from zero indicates that the
charity is a gross revenue maximiser, fundraising until the marginal pound brings in no
additional donations. If the marginal effect of fundraising is not different from one, then
the charity is said to be a net revenue maximiser, fundraising until the marginal pound
brings in one additional pound in donations. Results in earlier papers have suggested
that development charities were net revenue maximisers (Khanna et al 1995) or fundraise
short of net revenue maximisation in the long run (Khanna and Sandler 2000). Weisbrod
and Dominguez (1986) found US charities to be gross revenue maximisers.
17 The quadratic function of fundraising is maximised when fundraising equals £1.5 million. There




point estimate is consistent with development charities using a mixed strategy of net and
gross revenue maximisation in the short-run. However, the standard error of the estimate
(£0.33) means we cannot reject the hypothesis that the short-run marginal effect is equal
to 1, implying net revenue maximisation. The long-run marginal effect of fundraising is
much higher, 2.14 with a standard error of 0.83. This is comparable to the marginal effect
for development charities estimated with static models by Khanna et al (1995) of 2.31
and by Khanna and Sandler (2000) of 2.44 and is consistent with development charities
fundraising short of net revenue maximisation in the long run.
As price is consistently found to be statistically insigniﬁcant, we do not calculate the
total fundraising effect, taking into account the negative impact of fundraising operating
through the price, as is done in much of the earlier literature.
In addition to the potential crowding in/out of donations through changes in the pro-
vision of the public good in the form of ODA, changes in direct government funding to
charities via grants may also crowd in/out donations as earlier authors have emphasised.
We ﬁnd no evidence of this for development charities. This result is robust to both sam-
ple selection and the choice of instrument set. Note that in the results in columns (2)
and (3) of Table 2, where the endogeneity of grants is not instrumented (column (2)) or
not expunged (column (3)), the coefﬁcient on grants is positive and weakly signiﬁcant
indicating crowding in. That this effect disappears when appropriate instrumentation is
employed further underlines the importance of accounting for endogenous relationships
in models of donations.
A similar pattern can be seen for administrative expenditure as their estimated effect is
positive and signiﬁcant in the models that fail to properly deal with the endogeneity – see
again columns (2) and (3) in Table 2. In the preferred model, column (5), administrative
expenditure is found to have no ceteris paribus impact on donations, a result that is robust
to sample selection and the choice of instrument set. The results for autonomous income
are analogous.
24The distributions of marginal effects
Estimating marginal effects or elasticities at the mean characteristics assumes that
charity fundraising strategies do not vary across charities. This assumption is shown
to be violated in Tinkelman (2004), who noted that extreme values of expenditure can
disproportionately affect elasticities calculated at mean characteristics. He found that the
distribution of fundraising effects can be quite wide and that elasticities calculated at the
mean characteristics were generally not similar in size or signiﬁcance (even in sign) to
the mean elasticity. Table 5 shows the distribution across charity-years of both our short-
and long-run marginal effects of fundraising (under the assumption that the estimated
parameters of the model are constant over charities and time).
[Table 5 about here]
The short-run effect calculated at the mean value of fundraising is about over 80 per
cent larger than the mean marginal effect. The median marginal effect may provide a
better summary statistic given the clear positive skew in the distribution of fundraising
expenditure. On this basis, the ‘average’ development charity is closer to being a gross
revenue maximiser than a net revenue maximiser in the short run. In the long run it is less
clearthatthe‘average’charityfundraisesshortofnetrevenuemaximisation. Thereissub-
stantial variation not only between different charities but also within charities over time.
Given this situation, drawing conclusions about objective functions of charity fundraisers
must be done with care. The fundraising objective may vary not only from one charity
to another (see the between group standard deviations), but also over time for the same
charity (see the within group standard deviations). Note that we also report the distribu-
tion of the fundraising elasticities, though the pattern will be the same as these elasticities
are simply a monotonic transformation of the marginal effects.
Having obtained the marginal effects for each charity-year, we can relate them to both
the level of fundraising expenditure and time. We regress the long-run marginal fundrais-
ing effects on the lag of fundraising expenditure and a time trend using a within group
25estimator (the unit of analysis is the charity-year). Results were essentially identical when
contemporaneous fundraising expenditure was used. The coefﬁcient on fundraising ex-
penditure is negative by deﬁnition given the concavity of donations in fundraising. The
coefﬁcient on the time trend is equal to 0.06 (se=0.017).18 Results suggest that for devel-
opment charities, the marginal pound spent on fundraising brought in on average 6p more
than the previous year. per year. This means that over time development charities have
moved away from revenue maximisation towards a strategy of net revenue maximisation.
Such a change might occur if the objective function of charities has in fact changed. At
onetimemanagersofcharitiesmayhaveseentheirroleasmaximisingtherevenueoftheir
organisation. Over time managers may have shifted their priorities to net revenue or pro-
gramme expenditure maximisation, no longer willing to reduce programme expenditure
by 1 in order to generate a marginal increase in donations of 1p.
If the objective function of charities has not changed, this increase in the marginal
return to fundraising may also be in part driven by the research in this ﬁeld, which has
generally found a signiﬁcant price effect. We have shown here that, in the case of devel-
opment charities, a reasonable observation rule for the price and appropriate estimation
proceduresthatexpungetheendogenouscomponentsofprice, resultinthepricebeingsta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. Charity managers operating under the assumption that fundraising
expenditure will have a negative impact on donations via the price will underestimate the
revenue maximising level of fundraising.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have modelled the determinants of donations received by overseas de-
velopment charities in the UK, contributing to the relatively small literature on charitable
giving that considers particular causes. We have used panel data that span over 25 years,
and have drawn both on recent theory on giving for overseas causes and on advances in
recent years in the econometrics of panel data. Our results may be summarised as follows:
18 Using cluster robust standard errors
26• A dynamic speciﬁcation is a useful advance on the static models previously used
in the literature. Our charity panel easily rejects a static model. As a result we are
able to identify both short-run and long-run impacts of regressors.
• WeﬁndnoevidencethatpublicprovisionofthepublicgoodintheformofODAhas
crowded out donations for development, a possibility that had not been considered
in the extensive existing literature on crowding out. Nor do we ﬁnd evidence either
of crowding out or of crowding in by government grants to development charities.
• We cannot reject the hypothesis that giving to overseas development has a unitary
income elasticity in both the short and long run. This is in line with results from
survey microdata on individuals and their giving (Micklewright and Schnepf 2009).
Inter alia, a unitary elasticity implies that recessions do not have devastating im-
pacts on charitable giving. We ﬁnd no robust signiﬁcant impact from changes in
the inequality of household incomes, holding constant total income though there
is some weak evidence suggesting that increased inequality decreases giving for
development.
• Fundraising has a powerful effect on donations received by development charities
but the effect appears not to be monotonic. We ﬁnd that the impact of the price
faced by donors, as conventionally deﬁned in the literature, is not a signiﬁcant de-
terminant of donations.
• Estimating marginal effects and elasticities at the mean characteristics can produce
results which are not representative of the average charity. When effects are calcu-
lated for each charity-year we ﬁnd that the mean effect is not the same as the effect
calculated at the mean characteristic. When considering the distribution of marginal
effects, the ‘average’ development charity fundraises more closely to net revenue
maximisation than when considering the marginal effect calculated at the mean
characteristics. Moreover, there is evidence that the marginal effect of fundraising
fordevelopmentcharitieshasincreasedovertime. Thismayindicateachangeinthe
27objective function of charities or of the underestimation of the revenue maximising
level of fundraising expenditure.
• There is some evidence to suggest that the marginal effect of fundraising has in-
creased over time. This may indicate a shift in the objective function of develop-
ment charity managers away from gross revenue maximisation.
28References
Alfaro, R., Apr. 2008. Estimation of a dynamic panel data: The case of corporate invest-
ment in chile. Tech. rep., Central Bank of Chile.
Alvarez, J., Arellano, M., 2003. The time series and Cross-Section asymptotics of dy-
namic panel data estimators. Econometrica 71 (4), 1121–1159.
Andreoni, J., 2006. Philanthropy. In: Kolm, S. C., Ythier, J. M. (Eds.), Handbook of the
Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity. No. 2. Amsterdam, North Holland.
Andreoni, J., Payne, A. A., 2003. Do government grants to private charities crowd out
giving or fund-raising? American Economic Review 93 (3), 792–812.
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of speciﬁcation for panel data: Monte carlo
evidence and an application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies
58 (2), 277–97.
Atkinson, A., Jun. 2009. Giving overseas and public policy. Journal of Public Economics
93 (5-6), 647–653.
Atkinson, A. B., Backus, P. G., Micklewright, J., Pharoah, C., Schnepf, S. V., 2008.
Charitable giving for overseas development: UK trends over a quarter century. IZA
Discussion Paper 3872, forthcoming Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A.
Atkinson, R., Eastwood, A., Sep. 2007. Public attitudes to overseas giving: Does govern-
ment make a difference? S3RI Applications & Policy Working Papers, A07/05.
Bover, O., Arellano, M., 1995. Female labour force participation in the 1980s the case of
spain. Investigaciones Economicas 19 (2), 171–194.
Cameron, A. C., Trivedi, P. K., May 2005. Microeconometrics: methods and applications.
Cambridge University Press.
Duncan, B., May 1999. Modeling charitable contributions of time and money. Journal of
Public Economics 72 (2), 213–242.
Feldstein, M., 1975. The income tax and charitable contributions part II: the impact on
religious, educational and other organizations. National Tax Journal 28 (2).
Glazer, A., Konrad, K. A., 1996. A signaling explanation for charity. American Economic
Review 86 (4), 1019–28.
Hansen, L. P., 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments estima-
tors. Econometrica 50 (4), 1029–1054.
Horne, C. S., 2005. Do charitable donors know enough–and care Enough–About gov-
ernment subsidies to affect private giving to nonproﬁt organizations? Nonproﬁt and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly 34 (1), 136–149.
House of Commons, 2009. Aid under pressure: Support for development assistance in a
global economic downturn.
29Judson, R. A., Owen, A. L., Oct. 1999. Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide
for macroeconomists. Economics Letters 65 (1), 9–15.
Khanna, J., Posnett, J., Sandler, T., 1995. Charity donations in the UK: new evidence
based on panel data. Journal of Public Economics 56 (2), 257–272.
Khanna, J., Sandler, T., 2000. Partners in giving:: The crowding-in effects of UK govern-
ment grants. European Economic Review 44 (8), 1543–1556.
Micklewright, J., Schnepf, S. V., 2009. Who gives charitable donations for overseas de-
velopment? Journal of Social Policy 38 (2), 317–341.
Nickell, S., Nov. 1981. Biases in dynamic models with ﬁxed effects. Econometrica 49 (6),
1417–1426.
Okten, C., Weisbrod, B. A., Feb. 2000. Determinants of donations in private nonproﬁt
markets. Journal of Public Economics 75 (2), 255–272.
Orme, C., Yamagata, Y., 2006. The asymptotic distribution of the F-Test statistic for indi-
vidual effects. Econometrics Journal 9, 404–422.
Peloza, J., Steel, P., 2005. The price elasticities of charitable contributions: A Meta-
Analysis. Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 24 (2), 260–272.
Posnett, J., Sandler, T., 1989. Demand for charity donations in private non-proﬁt markets
: The case of the U.K. Journal of Public Economics 40 (2), 187–200.
Roodman, D., 2009a. How to do xtabond2: An introduction to difference and system
GMM in stata. Stata Journal 9 (1), 86–136.
Roodman, D., 2009b. A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics 71 (1), 135–158.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1982. Charitable giving and "Excessive" fundraising. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 97 (2), 193–212.
Sargan, J. D., 1958. The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental vari-
ables. Econometrica 26 (3), 393–415.
Solimano, A., 2005. Remittances by emigrants: issues and evidence. In: Atkinson, A. B.
(Ed.), New Sources of Development Finance. Oxford University Press.
Tinkelman, D., Aug. 2004. Using nonproﬁt organization-level ﬁnancial data to infer man-
agers’ fund-raising strategies. Journal of Public Economics 88 (9-10), 2181–2192.
Weisbrod, B. A., Dominguez, N. D., Jun. 1986. Demand for collective goods in private
nonproﬁt markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?
Journal of Public Economics 30 (1), 83–96.
Wooldridge, J. M., 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. The MIT
press, Cambridge, Mass.
30Appendix A. The charities used in this study
Table A.1: The charities used in this study
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Name First Year Last Year Observations
Acord 1992 2003 7
Actionaid 1977 2004 25
Africa Now 1987 1990 4
Amnesty International UK Section Charitable Trust 1992 2004 12
Befrienders International 1995 1999 4
Book Aid International 1993 2004 11
Britain-Nepal Medical Trust 1986 1992 4
British Leprosy Relief Association (Lepra) 1977 2004 25
British Red Cross Society 1977 2004 25
Care International UK 1985 2004 17
Catholic Agency For Overseas Development 1979 2004 25
Catholic Institute for International Relations 1989 2004 11
Childrens Aid Direct 1995 2000 5
Christian Aid 1977 2004 26
Christian Children’s Fund of Great Britain 1985 1999 13
Co-workers of Mother Teresa 1977 1993 15
Everychild 1990 2004 13
Farm Africa 1989 1996 4
Federation of Jewish Relief Organisations 1980 2000 12
Impact Foundation 1994 2001 7
Intermediate Technology Development Group 1984 2004 20
International Boys Town Trust 1986 1989 4
International Christian Relief 1984 2001 16
Karuna Trust 1987 2001 11
Leprosy Mission (International) 1978 2001 21
Marie Stopes International 1987 2004 17
Medecins Sans Frontieres (UK) 1996 2004 7
Medical Aid for Palestinians 1989 1996 6
Medical Aid For Poland Fund 1982 1991 9
Medical Emergency Relief International Charitable Trust 1997 2001 4
Notes: This table presents, in alphabetical order, the names of the charities used in this study, the year each
enters and exits our data and the number of observations we have for each.
31Table A.1: The charities used in this study (con’t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Name First Year Last Year Observations
Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims 1991 2004 13
Methodist Relief And Development Fund 1980 2001 17
Mines Advisory Group 1993 2003 6
Oasis Charitable Trust 1995 2004 8
Ockenden Venture 1981 2003 9
Operation Raleigh 1985 2004 14
Opportunity Trust 1994 2000 4
Oxfam 1977 2004 26
Plan International (UK) 1984 2003 18
Project Hope United Kingdom 1996 2001 6
Quaker Peace and Service 1981 2003 22
Rokpa Trust 1994 2000 6
Save the Children Fund 1977 2004 26
Scottish Catholic International Aid Fund 1986 2004 18
Sightsavers 1977 2004 25
SOS Children’s Villages UK 1986 2001 13
SOS Sahel International 1991 1999 5
St Francis Leprosy Guild 1977 1995 10
St Josephs Hospice Association 1986 2001 15
Sudan United Mission 1977 1984 7
Survive Miva 1987 2001 11
Tearfund 1977 2004 26
UNICEF 1981 2004 22
Voluntary Service Overseas 1977 2004 26
War On Want 1978 2000 15
Wateraid 1985 2004 19
World Evangelism Society of Great Britain 1985 1993 5
World Vision UK 1984 2004 20
Notes: This table presents, in alphabetical order, the names of the charities used in this study, the year each
enters and exits our data and the number of observations we have for each.
32Appendix B. Instrument proliferation and collapsing the
instrument set
To illustrate this problem, consider the following example with one endogenous re-
gressor xit.
yit = βxit +αi+εit t = 1,...,5 (4)
If we were to apply 2SLS to estimate (3) in ﬁrst-differences, xit−2 and higher order
lags of x can be used as an instrument for ￿xit under the assumption that E[xit −s￿εit]=
0 for s ≥ 2. This would imply that the estimation sample would be t = 3,...,5 and
every additional lag of a variable to the set of instruments would result in the loss of one
extra time observation. In contrast, the standard GMM-diff approach includes separate
instruments for each time period resulting in a sparse instrument set but larger estimation
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For example, the instruments for the regressor’s observation (xi3−xi2) would be xi1.
Three practical problems can result with the use of a sparse instrument set (Roodman
2009a). First, the instrument set can be too weak to identify the relevant effects. Sec-
ond, the precision of the weighting matrix that is used in the GMM estimation is affected.
Third, some of the statistical tests that are used for model validation can have low power.
Given these problems, we investigated the approach of a strand of the literature where
the standard GMM-diff instruments are combined through addition to create a smaller in-







xi2 xi1 0 .





This is using the ‘collapse’ option in estimation command xtabond2.
34Appendix C. Variation in the depth of the instrument set
Taking the model in column (3) of table 2, we wish to test the sensitivity of the results
to truncation of the number of lags used in the instrument set. I present results from
re-estimation of the using various truncations of the instrument set in table C.1.
Table C.1: Varying instrument set lag depth for partially quadratic model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Lag depth: <3 <4 <5 <6 <11 <16
Lag Log Donations 0.735*** 0.654*** 0.698*** 0.658*** 0.641*** 0.620***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.086) (0.085) (0.061) (0.057)
Group A: Macroeconomic Variables
Log HH Income 0.610** 0.699** 0.618** 0.657** 0.591** 0.648***
(0.269) (0.272) (0.271) (0.276) (0.242) (0.238)
Log Net ODA -0.062 -0.019 -0.042 -0.042 -0.015 -0.002
(0.146) (0.139) (0.129) (0.127) (0.108) (0.109)
90/50 ratio -0.520 -0.304 -0.338 -0.398 -0.453 -0.301
(0.371) (0.366) (0.329) (0.320) (0.337) (0.322)
Tsunami 0.217** 0.218** 0.220** 0.203** 0.189** 0.206**
(0.098) (0.095) (0.095) (0.089) (0.084) (0.085)
1984 0.340*** 0.351*** 0.344*** 0.337*** 0.338*** 0.348***
(0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.110) (0.109)
1985 0.027 0.030 0.021 0.031 0.036 0.036
(0.075) (0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.077) (0.079)
Group B: Charity Speciﬁc Variables
Price -0.296 -0.896 -0.585 -0.926 -0.650 -1.112*
(0.876) (0.901) (0.791) (0.811) (0.685) (0.607)
Admin -0.277 -0.201 -0.190 -0.029 0.034 0.000
(0.404) (0.398) (0.376) (0.299) (0.222) (0.206)
Fundraising 0.528 0.552 0.577 0.693** 0.756*** 0.729***
(0.423) (0.387) (0.356) (0.285) (0.236) (0.183)
Fundraising2 -0.178 -0.182 -0.183* -0.217** -0.256*** -0.236***
(0.131) (0.123) (0.108) (0.089) (0.072) (0.061)
Grants 0.048 0.075 0.054 0.020 0.010 0.032
(0.065) (0.080) (0.050) (0.038) (0.037) (0.028)
Autonomous Inc -0.034 -0.054 -0.045 -0.025 -0.003 -0.031
(0.064) (0.071) (0.056) (0.047) (0.031) (0.024)
Charities 58 58 58 58 58 58
Observations 577 577 577 577 577 577
Instruments 32 44 56 68 128 188
AR(1) 0.037 0.073 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
AR(2) 0.146 0.113 0.121 0.120 0.168 0.125
Hansen 0.037 0.073 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Sargan 0.193 0.334 0.407 0.039 0.627 0.921
35Taking the model in column (4) of table 2, we wish to test the sensitivity of the results
to truncation of the number of lags used in the instrument set. Results are presented in
table C.2.
36Table C.2: Varying instrument set lag depth for fully quadratic model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator: GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
Lag depth: <3 <4 <5 <6 <11 <16
Lag Log Donations 0.707*** 0.651*** 0.655*** 0.646*** 0.615*** 0.601***
(0.109) (0.100) (0.091) (0.090) (0.069) (0.068)
Group A: Macroeconomic Variables
Log HH Income 0.479 0.575** 0.508** 0.538** 0.567** 0.639***
(0.296) (0.259) (0.249) (0.251) (0.231) (0.231)
Log Net ODA 0.017 0.038 0.036 -0.008 0.034 0.052
(0.144) (0.141) (0.136) (0.141) (0.117) (0.115)
90/50 ratio -0.567 -0.238 -0.236 -0.287 -0.208 -0.230
(0.495) (0.449) (0.348) (0.362) (0.315) (0.301)
Tsunami 0.241** 0.239** 0.247*** 0.225** 0.225*** 0.233***
(0.110) (0.103) (0.092) (0.089) (0.086) (0.084)
1984 0.327*** 0.337*** 0.331*** 0.323*** 0.343*** 0.355***
(0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.107)
1985 0.018 0.011 0.002 0.013 0.025 0.030
(0.092) (0.092) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.083)
Group B: Charity Speciﬁc Variables
Price -13.010 -13.620 -15.744** -13.332 -5.969 -7.226
(13.722) (11.819) (7.467) (8.164) (7.144) (5.413)
Price2 5.146 5.164 6.056** 5.027 1.954 2.494
(5.711) (4.847) (3.054) (3.316) (2.845) (2.174)
Admin 1.140 0.667 0.833 0.396 0.655 0.683
(0.962) (0.750) (0.610) (0.593) (0.489) (0.439)
Admin2 -0.927 -0.435 -0.566 -0.078 -0.977** -0.874**
(1.349) (1.087) (0.950) (0.747) (0.465) (0.379)
Fundraising 0.875** 0.777** 0.974*** 1.036*** 0.848*** 0.808***
(0.389) (0.348) (0.319) (0.247) (0.226) (0.186)
Fundraising2 -0.284** -0.230* -0.308*** -0.330*** -0.279*** -0.266***
(0.141) (0.123) (0.111) (0.079) (0.077) (0.067)
Grants -0.050 0.025 0.021 -0.025 0.001 0.047
(0.267) (0.214) (0.186) (0.151) (0.098) (0.075)
Grants2 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.026) (0.022) (0.018) (0.015) (0.007) (0.006)
Autonomous Inc -0.045 -0.107 -0.113 -0.071 -0.051 -0.070
(0.216) (0.200) (0.148) (0.120) (0.064) (0.051)
Autonomous Inc2 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Charities 58 58 58 58 58 58
Observations 577 577 577 577 577 577
Instruments 40 56 72 88 168 248
AR(1) 0 0 0 0 0 0
AR(2) 0.076 0.068 0.058 0.07 0.096 0.082
Hansen 0.119 0.000 0.032 0.872 1 1
Sargan 0.154 0.38 0.544 0.16 0.76 0.978
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